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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, * 
Plaintiff/Appellee, * 
vs. * CASE NO- 900148 
DONALD WAYNE BROWN, * Priority 2 
Defendant/Appellant• * 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
A number of issues raised by the Defendant on appeal were not 
raised in the trial court below. With regard to those issues, the 
State has argued in its "Introduction To Argument" that this Court 
abandon its openness to reviewing issues based on a Constitutional 
question where the Defendant's liberty is at stake. State v. 
Jamison, 800 P.2d 798 (Utah, 1990); State v. Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 
440 (Utah, 1983). 
The State first argues that the second prong of the test is 
meaningless because in a criminal case, the Defendant's liberty is 
always at stake. While some day that may be true, this Court can 
take judicial notice that at present, Utah law provides for 
probation, and further, that when incarceration is imposed, 
frequently such sentence will have been served by the time an 
appeal is decided. This prong of the test, therefore, eliminates 
the majority of criminal cases where no incarceration is imposed 
or the length of incarceration is unsubstantial. See also B., 
N.H., In re, 777 P.2d 487 (Ct. App. 1989) a juvenile case holding 
no liberty interest involved. 
The State then argues that the Court of Appeals has recently 
had difficulty applying this test in State v. Harrison, 152 Utah 
Adv. Rep- 19, 24 n. 13 (Utah Ct. App. Jan. 14, 1991) and State v. 
Hargraves, No. 890684-CA, slip op. at 5-6 (Utah Ct. App. Feb. 7, 
1991). A careful reading of the Harrison decision reveals that 
while the opinion claimed that "We do not find a liberty interest 
at stake because of the remoteness of the gender-bias issue to 
Harrison's main claim of improper racial motivation, " (Ftnt. 13, 
p. 30), it was in effect applying the harmless error rule, or 
concluding there was no merit to the claim, noting on the gender 
make-up of the jury, that even with the exclusion of two hispanic 
women on peremptory challenges by the State, that the Defendant 
still ended up with five women on his jury." The standard is not 
difficult to apply and should not be abandoned because of the 
Harrison case not analyzing and deciding the gender make-up issue. 
Finally, the State cites the inconsistent application of the 
rule in Harrison as opening a flood of federal habeas reviews of 
Utah cases under the ruling of Coleman v. Saffle, 869 F.2d 1377, 
1382-83 (10th Cir. 1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 1835 (1990). 
A careful reading of the Coleman analysis reveals that Coleman 
had in fact been treated quite unfairly by the Oklahoma appeals 
courts. The opinion cited a number of cases in which Defendants 
were, on appeal, given the benefit of case law enunciated between 
trial and appeal where trial counsel could not have preserved error 
based on the as yet unenunciated case law, but where Coleman was 
not permitted such review under the appellate court's "sufficient 
reason" test. 
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A "sufficient reason" rule is obviously more difficult to 
impose with consistency than the "Constitutional issue/liberty of 
Defendant" rule. In addition, the unfair application of the 
"sufficient reason" rule was manifest with regard to Coleman and 
there is little evidence to suggest that Oklahoma's misapplication 
of its "sufficient reason" rule in Coleman opened the flood gates 
of Oklahoma federal habeas reviews. 
The "Constitutional issue/liberty of Defendant" rule is a 
useful tool for appellate review of substantial Constitutional 
issues which should have been raised at the trial level in cases 
where the Defendant's liberty is at stake. 
Counsel for the State has in its brief scrambled the order of 
the issues as presented in Appellant's brief. For purposes of 
clarity, the Appellant will stick to the original order of the 
issues with reference made to the designation given that issue by 
the State, if different. 
ISSUE I. 
Expanded Statement of Facts 
Defendant believes the State has overstated the facts in 
support of its argument that the warrantless search and seizure of 
Defendant's property be upheld under the exceptions of consent or 
plain view. Hence a more in depth review of the pertinent 
testimony from the suppression hearing held January 24, 1990 is 
provided. 
The State stipulated that Defendant Brown and two co-workers 
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and co-defendants, Cummins, and Cayer, were on the date of the 
search and seizure living in the trailer searched, and that much 
of their personal property was in that trailer. (Trans, p. 40, 11. 
3-6). According to State's witness, Anderson, perishable food 
items for all of the camp were kept in the refrigerator in that 
trailer while non-perishable items were kept in all the trailers 
(p. 65-66, 11. 21-6). The common practice was to knock before 
entering (p. 66, 1. 13-16). There was a privacy interest (p. 66, 
11. 17, 18). Sometimes they had direct access to the food in the 
refrigerator but sometimes it would be handed out to them (p. 62, 
11. 17-25, p. 66, 11. 19-24). 
The ground radios were kept in trailer number three (p. 64, 
1. 5), and all had access to the trailer to use the ground radio 
(p. 64, 11. 11-13). The radios were kept straight in front of the 
door in a little night stand (p. 65, 11. 4-6). The workers had 
"common respect not to go into somebody else's trailer unless they 
were there." (p. 70, 11. 9, 10). The only exception was if they 
needed food (p. 70, 1. 16). As for the radios, "during the day the 
radios were mostly on the boats or with the people that were in the 
trucks hauling whatever." (p. 70, 11. 17-19). 
According to Deputy Roger Olsen, the search of the trailers 
began after the van with the prisoners left at 11:15 AM although 
the prisoners had been handcuffed and placed in a trailer at 8:35 
AM (p. 23, 11. 7-24). Officer Ward was the controlling officer at 
the scene (p. 24, 11. 5, 6). According to Officer Ward, he and 
Officer Yeates searched trailer #3 around 1:00 PM (p. 43, 11. 5-
4 
9), p. 34, 11. 3-10). This was after Officer Yeates told him that 
someone had given permission to enter and search the trailer (p. 
33, 11. 14 - p. 34, 1. 2). 
Of the three officers that testified, all three had entered 
the trailer earlier for some particular reason prior to the major 
search that occurred at about 1:00 PM. Officer Olsen went in three 
times. The first time was shortly after arriving at the camp to 
check for other individuals posing a threat or any weapons that 
could be used (p. 16, 11. 19, 20). He went back two other times 
to look for cigarettes for co-defendants, Brown and Cayer, and was 
told first to look on the bunk and then in the third drawer under 
the sink (p. 17, 1. 20 - p. 18, 1. 8). On the initial search, 
"nobody found no weapons readily observed." (p. 17, 11. 4, 5). On 
the second time in, he doesn't recall seeing any of the evidence 
that was ultimately seized from that trailer (p. 18, 11. 10-13). 
Officer Ward, in charge of the crime scene, went inside the 
trailer twice with Deputy Olsen to retrieve the cigarettes prior 
to the afternoon search (p. 29, 11. 10-12, p. 31, 11. 3-7). On the 
first trip in, the only evidence that he observed in plain view was 
a pasteboard box with blood on the outside and magazines inside, 
a pair of white tennis shoes with blood on them, and a crescent 
wrench (p. 29, 1. 15 - p. 30, 1. 11). He observed nothing in 
addition to those three items on his second trip inside (p. 31, 11. 
8-11) . Officer Ward and Officer Yeates later went back in together 
for the thorough search (p. 34, 11. 3, 4). A pink bag, later 
identified as Defendants and containing his clothes, was at that 
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time located "in the table area sitting on one of the benches." (p. 
36, 11. 17-21). Defendant's white folding knife was found on the 
top bunk at the rear of the trailer (p. 36, 1. 22 - p. 37, 1. 3). 
Officer Yeates went into the trailer prior to the later 
thorough search to get some medication for co-defendant, Cayer (p. 
74, 19-24). On that trip, he recalled seeing tennis shoes with a 
red stain, a cardboard box with a red stain, waders or hip boots 
with stains, and "sitting on the sink in plain view was a wrench 
that was wet." (p. 75, 1. 16 - p. 76, 1. 14). He recalled seeing 
nothing else on this occasion (p. 76, 11. 20-22). Officer Yeates 
went in a second time to get a radio (p. 82, 11. 23-25). Nothing 
is stated regarding observation of any more evidence. He "simply 
stepped in, grabbed the radio, and stepped out." (p. 89, 11. 11, 
12) . He went in a third time after radio conversation with one of 
the owner's, Pat Benchley (p. 82, 11. 23-25). At first this 
officer testified that he had collected the evidence including the 
pink bag and saw the butt end of a knife on the top bunk at the 
rear end of the trailer prior to talking to Benchley (p. 77, 11. 
1-10, p. 81, 11. 3-25). Later on in the hearing, he corrected his 
testimony. He then made it clear that the search and seizure and 
observation of the pink bag occurred after talking with Benchley 
(p. 82, 11. 20-25) when he entered with Officer Ward and one other 
officer (p. 91, 11. 1-4). Officer Yeates didn't see any items 
other than the tennis shoes, hip waders, cardboard box, and wrench 
on his preliminary entries (p. 90, 11. 2-13). 
Officer Shephard testified that Officer Ward sent him out the 
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next day to retrieve the white folding knife on the top bunk (p. 
97, 11. 2-24). 
Argument 
The State concedes that the trial court's reliance on the 
search incident to arrest and exigent circumstances exceptions to 
the warrant requirement are questionable but still argues for the 
plain view and consent basis of the search and seizure of 
Defendant's bag of clothing and his folding knife. The State first 
argues that the consent exception is appropriate because the owner 
of the trailer and the business had authority over the "common 
areas" of trailer #3 that were associated with the employment 
activities of the business. The argument that entry by an employee 
other than a resident of trailer #3 for purposes of securing food 
or a radio makes that trailer a "common area" ignores the 
legitimate expectation of privacy that was demonstrated by the 
workers in the camp. In addition to knocking, the food required 
was often handed to them. The radios were out in the boats and 
trucks during the day and when inside the trailer, were just inside 
the door. "The core inquiry is whether a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the area searched." United States v. 
Bilanzich, 771 F.2d 292, 296, citing Jones v. United States, 357 
U.S. 493, 497, 78 S. Ct. 1253, 1256, 2 L.Ed 2d 1514. In Bilanzich, 
authority by the owner to consent was found with regard only to 
the business office in which he had the defendant conduct the hotel 
business. This employee had three other rooms to use as her 
personal residence. 
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Neither of the other cases cited by the State are particularly 
helpful either in resolving the core issue of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Donovan v. A. A. Biero Construction Co., 
746 F.2d 894, 898-90O (D.C. Circ. 1984) "involved open construction 
areas devoid of any reasonable expectations of privacy." That 
opinion further notes that the citations involving a changing shed 
and a tool trailer had been vacated. State v. Kendrick, 736 P.2d 
1079 (1987) involved a roofing business's shop which the defendant 
claimed to be using as his "crash pad". The shop was used 
primarily to hold roofing materials and personal items of the 
owner. The consents to search given by the owners in both of these 
cases pertained to property not only having a primary business 
purpose, but also where the actual use was not restricted primarily 
to an employee for his residence. 
Defendant Brown and the other two co-tenants in the trailer 
had a strong and reasonable expectation of privacy in their trailer 
despite the incidental use of their refrigerator for perishable 
food and the night stand inside the door for the radios. 
The State next argues that even if the trailer's owner could 
not give valid consent, the search would still be valid if the 
officer acted in a good faith belief that the person giving consent 
had the authority to do so. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793 
(1990), extended the "good faith" exception to otherwise invalid 
warrantless consent searches under the Federal Constitution. 
This Court should not follow the lead of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in this regard. To do so could virtually wipe out privacy 
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interests in their residence of any sort of tenant. What landlord 
does not have an occasional business purpose for entry into a 
residence and what police officer would not seek the consent of the 
landlord rather than that of the tenant whose residence he seeks 
to search. 
The State correctly criticizes appellant for not having 
provided an analysis of the question under Article I, Section 14 
of the Utah Constitution which the Defendant urged as a separate 
basis for suppressing the seized evidence. 
The Utah Supreme Court has in recent years recognized the need 
to provide protection for its citizens under the Utah Constitution 
as the federal Court has scaled back the protections afforded under 
the federal Constitution. In State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 
1987), even though the "good faith" exception provided by Utah Code 
77-35-12(g) was found to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution, footnote 4 of the opinion notes 
reservation for the future of the level of conduct required by the 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14. Justice Zimmerman 
(concurring) notes that even if the court's reading of United 
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed. 2d 677 
(1984) were in error (good faith exception limited to searches 
pursuant to a warrant), Utah Code 77-35-12(g) wouldn't necessarily 
be saved, in that the protections under Article 1, Section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution have never been carefully considered. See 
State v. Hvcrh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-74 (Utah, 1985). 
The Utah Court fleshed out a part of Article 1, Section 14 of 
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the Utah Constitution in State v. Larocco, 794 P. 2d 460 (Utah, 
1990) where it was expressly held that the exclusionary rule was 
a necessary consequence of police violations of the Utah 
Constitution, The opinion noted that at least 18 other states have 
adopted an independent state constitutional exclusionary rule. 
Even though dealing with an automobile search, the following 
language from Larocco resonates even more in the context of search 
of a residence. 
Specifically this Court will continue to use the 
concept of expectation of privacy as a suitable threshold 
criterion for determining whether Article I, section 14 
is applicable. Then if Article I, section 14 applies, 
warrantless searches will be permitted only where they 
satisfy their traditional justification, namely to 
protect the safety of police or the public or to prevent 
the destruction of evidence (p. 469). 
In focusing on the expectation of privacy and requiring the State 
to show a traditional justification for a warrantless search in 
this case, it is evident that none have been proposed. The State 
has not carried its burden of proof for a warrantless search. 
State v. Christiansen. SIS P.2d 408 (Utah, 1984). 
Other states have declined to apply the "good faith" exception 
of Leon to their state constitutions. People v. Biqelow, 488 
N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1985) sets out three primary public policy reasons 
for not adapting the good faith exception. (1) The exclusionary 
rule's purpose is frustrated. (2) A premium is placed on illegal 
[or lazy] police action. (3) A positive incentive is provided to 
others to engage in similar lawless acts in the future. That 
opinion reminds us that constitutional protections are not only for 
the protection of the defendant, but for the protection of all 
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citizens. In accord are New Jersey (State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 
820 (1987)), Michigan (People v. Sundlina, 395 N.W.2d 308 (1986)), 
Massachusetts (Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548 (1985)), 
Wisconsin (State v. Grawien, 367 N.E.2d 816 (1985), but noting 
other states that have adopted Leon), and North Carolina (State v. 
Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553 (1988)). The North Carolina court, in 
Carter, "justifies its exclusionary rule not only on deterrence but 
upon the preservation of the integrity of the judicial branch of 
government..." (at 516), as protector of the rights of all of its 
citizens under the state constitution. 
The good faith exception of Illinois v. Rodriguez should not 
be adopted by this Court and applied to the Utah Constitution. 
Finally, the State argues that the search and the seizure of 
the bag of clothes and the knife come under the plain view 
exception. The State attempts to shift the burden to the Defendant 
by alleging that the Defendant does not claim that the clothes bag 
and the knife were not in plain view or that probable cause to 
believe they were evidence of a crime did not exist. The State has 
the burden of proof and review of the facts show that neither the 
bag of clothes nor the knife were observed by any of the police 
officers until after their re-entry into the trailer for the 
specific purpose of searching it and seizing property. If the 
search is upheld as valid based on consent, then the plain view 
argument is irrelevant. If the search is not upheld on consent, 
there was no plain view and the argument must fail. 
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ISSUE II. 
The State argues in its Point IX that despite defense counsel 
not being prepared to step in and proceed as instructed by the 
court, that Defendant has failed to show how the cross-examinations 
were deficient or that the result would probably have been 
different. 
While the material that defense counsel had to master included 
949 pages of preliminary hearing testimony, an example of Mr. 
Willmore's frustrations is an in-chambers conference with the Judge 
after attempting to lead Denton Beecher, the County Surveyor, 
through testimony regarding some charts he had drawn and the lines 
of vision that Richard Anderson would have been limited to in 
making his observations. Willmore states: 
I want to make a motion for a mistrial on the basis that 
the - for example, while we were questioning Mr. Beecher, 
I had him mark a foot and a half back into the trailer, 
and you honor did make several comments about the 
witnesses testified that they were moving all around. 
This, that, and the other, I was not characterizing. 
That that's absolutely where or anything. And I think 
it's improper for the court to refer to that and go over 
it several times to the jury as to what the testimony has 
been. I had not mischaracterized it, anything 
whatsoever, and I make a motion for a mistrial on that 
basis [T. 757:4-13]. 
Mr. Willmore's difficulties in examining the witnesses and the 
very different understanding of their testimony from what the judge 
was hearing is evident. 
In addition, Willmore failed to call Ray Cabututan as a 
witness regarding the fact that he alone handled the crescent 
wrench. The State objects that the partial transcript of his 
testimony in his own trial, which preceded Brown's, on January 22-
12 
26, 1990, which was included in Defendant's Addendum, wasn't 
certified. A complete copy of the transcript from Cabututan's 
trial would have been too voluminous to have included. This Court 
can take judicial notice of its own records in State v. Raymond 
Cabututan, Supreme Court #900289. That record is either in the 
possession of the Clerk or else with Assistant Attorney General 
Judy Atherton, who last checked out the file. 
Cabututan's testimony against his own penal interest, that he 
was the only one who had the wrench would have cast substantial 
doubt on the accuracy of Richard Anderson's observations and 
testimony. 
The performance of counsel was deficient in some demonstrable 
manner and the outcome of the trial would probably have been 
different but for the error. State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645. 
ISSUE III. 
The State argues, in its Point VIII, that the Defendant did 
not preserve the issue of his appointed counsel's conflict of 
interest for appeal. Defendant requests that this Court address 
this issue under the plain error or exceptional circumstances 
rules. 
Although the Defendant, in filing his Motion For Dismissal of 
Attorney [Ct. Record 242-245, Exhibit A of Addendum to Appellant's 
Brief], was primarily concerned about his appointed attorney's lack 
of diligence in investigation and preparation for trial, he also 
stated he was unhappy about counsel's divulging "things about my 
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case" to the court and the other defendants' attorneys. Thus the 
court was well aware of Defendant's concerns regarding this 
particular attorney's commitment to his representation. While it 
seems likely that the District Judge sitting in Box Elder County 
must have known that counsel was the city prosecutor for two of the 
municipalities in his county, his attention was surely drawn to 
that fact during the questioning of Mr. Munns as a prospective 
juror when defense counsel, assisting in voir dire, inquired as to 
ill feelings from having prosecuted a member of the juror's family 
the prior year (T. 84-86). The trial court's error in appointing 
counsel should have been obvious at that point. 
The Defendant also asserts that the error was harmful. In 
addition to the reasons stated in Defendant's Motion For Dismissal 
of Attorney, counsel did not request a continuance although 
relatively unprepared when Defendant foundered in his attempt at 
pro se representation and the Judge called Defendant and counsel 
into chambers, didn't properly object to prior bad acts evidence, 
failed to call co-defendant Ray Cabututan regarding his sole use 
of the wrench, didn't vigorously object to the jury's continued 
deliberation for 13+ hours after a full day of trial, and didn't 
object to an Allen instruction. The error affected the substantial 
rights of the Defendant and was harmful. 
The Defendant further asserts that this error constituted a 
violation of his constitutional rights to effective assistance of 
counsel, and due process under Article I, Sections 12 and 7 of the 
Utah Constitution. The court should review such issues when, as 
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in this case, the liberty of the defendant is at stake. State v. 
Jamison, 800 P.2d 798 (Utah, 1990). 
This Court could, however, resolve this matter without need 
to address the constitutional issues. It could follow the example 
of People v. Rhodes, 524 P.2d 363 (Cal. 1974), by the exercise of 
its plenary power. That court, in holding "that city attorneys who 
have prosecutorial responsibilities may not represent criminal 
defendants" (at 367) also states, "Our judicially declared rule 
renders a determination of these constitutional issues 
unnecessary." (Ftnt. 13, p. 368). 
Among the reasons stated in the Rhodes decision for the rule 
are the conflicting interests a city prosecutor would likely be 
subjected to including maintaining good relations with the police 
departments, noting that: 
Neighboring and overlapping law enforcement agencies have 
close working relationships, and resentment engendered 
by a city attorney within the membership of such agencies 
would have an adverse effect on the relationship of the 
city attorney with members of his own local police 
department. (p.3 6 6). 
Other compelling public policy considerations are a weakening 
of assistance to law enforcement agencies during or because of a 
vigorous representation of a criminal defendant by a public 
prosecutor, the need for the public to have absolute confidence in 
the integrity and impartiality of our system of criminal justice, 
and the avoidance of the appearance of impropriety. Rhodes cites 
opinion 34 of the Committee on Professional Ethics of the American 
Bar Association as well as Karlin v. State, 177 N.W.2d (Wise. 1970) 
and Goodson v. Pevton, 351 F.2d 905, 909 (4th Cir. 1961) in support 
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of this position. 
While reversing the conviction, the Rhodes opinion goes out 
of its way to not criticize the quality of legal counsel or the 
judge for making the appointment. (Ftnt. 4, p. 365). It found 
this type of conflict so compelling that it did not require a 
separate showing of prejudice. 
Finally, the State, in its brief, argues that the record does 
not establish that defense counsel was a part-time city attorney 
and prosecutor at the time he was appointed to represent the 
Defendant. 
This Court is asked to take judicial notice, as did the court 
in Rhodes, ftnt. 1, p. 364, when faced with a similar argument by 
the state, of defense counsel's employment as a city attorney. The 
identity of a public official is a proper subject for judicial 
notice. While requests for affidavits were made to both the City 
of Garland and the City of Tremonton regarding Mr. Willmore's 
employment as their city attorney during the time he was 
representing the Defendant, only the City of Tremonton complied 
with the request. An original Affidavit of Paul Buys, City 
Recorder for the City of Tremonton, is attached together with a 
Professional Services Agreement (Exhibit A of Addendum) which shows 
that Thomas Willmore was employed as the city prosecutor at the 
time of trial, February 12-15 and 20, 1990. The Defendant moves 
this Court to take judicial notice of that fact. 
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ISSUE IV. 
The State argues, in its Point III, that while the 
prosecutor's reference to Defendant as a "mad dog" was probably 
improper, that it was not reversible error. 
In light of the defense of Defendant that his involvement was 
to look for a knife on the victim, that he eventually intervened 
and separated the combatants, and the fact that he called the owner 
the next morning when he discovered that Miguel was dead, the "mad 
dog" was highly inflammatory and should be regarded as reversible 
error. 
ISSUE V. 
The State argues, in its Point II, that the Defendant, while 
objecting to testimony of unrelated prior bad acts of the 
Defendant, did not specifically object under Rules 404 and 405, 
Utah Rules of Evidence, but instead objected that the questioning 
by the prosecutor on re-direct examination was beyond the scope of 
recross. 
While defense counsel was correct in his objection and the 
testimony should not have been permitted on that basis, its 
admission was also plain error in violation of Rules 404 and 405. 
The Defendant, in undertaking his own defense and cross-examining 
one of the State's witnesses, nearly opened up a can of worms 
regarding his own character before he was interrupted by his court-
appointed attorney and abandoned that line of questioning [T. 378: 
1-2]. Then on redirect examination, the State's attorney attempted 
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to introduce evidence of a threat by Defendant against another co-
worker other than the deceased. Defense counsel began making his 
objection but was rudely interrupted by the State's attorney before 
he could complete h^s objection. The context of the objection made 
it clear that the objection was directed at any evidence of any 
belligerence to any third person [T. 432-433 attached as Exhibit 
B in Addendum]. 
Whether plain error is viewed under the two-prong test of 
State v. Eldridqe, 773 P. 2d 29 (Utah, 1989) or the standard 
presented in Justice Stewart's dissent in that same case, it is 
present. The first inquiry is whether it should have been obvious 
to a trial court that it was committing error. While defense 
counsel was cut off and never did complete his statement of his 
objection, the State's attorney had already made it clear that he 
was asking about an "altercation" [T. 432:19] involving Ed 
Robinson, or Black Eddie [T. 432:15] who obviously was not the 
victim, Miguel Ramirez, nor State's witness, Eddie Apadoca. Hence, 
the error should have been obvious. 
The second prong is also satisfied, namely that it affect the 
substantial rights of the accused, i.e., that the error be harmful. 
Not only did the State succeed in eliciting the fact that the 
Defendant had had a prior altercation with another co-worker at the 
camp but that the Defendant had also made a statement afterward 
that he'd like to see him dead. Thi^ evidence was extremely 
harmful in light of Defendant's defense that he had not assaulted 
the victim but merely intervened by trying to look for and remove 
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a knife from the victim's possession during the fight [T. 800:16-
24], later broke up the fight by pulling Williams off the victim 
and pushing Cayer back [T. 803:15-21], and then upon discovering 
the victim dead the next morning called by radio to report it [T. 
809:21-810:4], confirmed by the owner that Defendant Brown had 
called him at about 7:00 AM that morning to report the death [T. 
524:8-21]. 
The error satisfies the prior standard for plain error 
enunciated by Justice Steward in Eldridge (dissenting): "that the 
error must be palpable and made to appear on the face of the record 
and to the manifest prejudice of the accused." (at 42) and comes 
well within the majority statement of the rule as elucidated in 
footnote 8. 
...[I]n appropriate cases we can exercise our discretion 
to dispense with the requirement of obviousness so that 
justice can be done, as when an error not readily 
apparent to the Court or counsel proves harmful in 
retrospect• 
. • .At bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is to permit 
us to avoid injustice. No statement of the factors that 
are important to our deliberations on the point should 
be read to limit our power to achieve that end. 
Eldridge at 35. 
ISSUE VI. 
The cases cited by the State, in its Point V, even at the most 
extreme, involves 12 hours of straight jury deliberation. Farmer 
v. State, 603 P.2d 700 (Nev. 1979). In the instant case, 13 1/2 
hours, following immediately upon a full day of trial exceeds the 
bounds of reasonableness. The sole inquiry made by the court after 
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ten hours of deliberation was whether the jury had a verdict. The 
report by the bailiff an hour later that they "were moving along" 
tends to support Defendant's contention that the court did not make 
sufficient inquiry when defense counsel moved to recess the jury 
so that they could rest. Defendant requests this Court to take 
judicial notice of the difficulty human beings have in performing 
quality work after Deing deprived of sleep and working straight for 
22 hours, trial plus deliberation. 
This error is compounded by the Allen instruction, Allen v. 
United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), and should constitute 
reversible error, whether under the Sixth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution or Article I, Sections 10 and 12 of the Utah 
Constitution, or under the plenary powers of this Court. 
ISSUE VII. 
The State, in its Point IV, does not argue that the Allen 
instruction given was proper, but only that the Defendant failed 
to object at trial, hence waiving the error. The Court should 
address this issue, in that it involves a Constitutional issue and 
the Defendant's liberty is at stake. State v. Jamison, 800 P.2d 
798 (Utah, 1990). 
Even under the application of the plain error rule, this 
error, amplified by the lengthy deliberations of the jury and the 
other errors presented in this appeal, constituted such prejudice 
to the Defendant that the first prong of the plain error rule 




The State, in its Point VI, claims, quoting State v. Verdin, 
595 P. 2d 862 (Utah, 1979) that the distinctions in levels of 
proscribed conduct between Aggravated Assault (76-5-103(1)(b) and 
Threatening With a Dangerous Weapon (76-10-506) are clear and 
easily comprehended. That may have been true in the Verdin case 
where a firearm was involved. 
However, the only distinction that Defendant can decipher 
between Utah Code 76-10-506 aid Aggravated Assault when the assault 
is charged under the subsection (b) alternative of the assault 
statute, is the show of immediate force or violence, which, in the 
context of this case in the light most favorable to the State 
involved a crescent wrench rather than a firearm, is a requirement 
of close proximity of the parties. No such evidence was produced 
at trial and at most therefore the Defendant could have been guilty 
of Utah Code 76-10-506. 
ISSUE IX. 
On this issue, State's Point VII, there is agreement regarding 
the error in ordering an indigent defendant to pay all costs 
including attorney's fees. However, this portion of the sentence 
could simply be vacated givan the Defendant's indigent status 
rather than requiring a hearing. 
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CONCLUSION 
This case should be remanded for new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this (( day of April, 1991 IL 
/ttutL^ 71JJ-
Nathan Hult 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby give notice that I hand delivered four copies of the 
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to counsel for the 
Plaintiff/Appellee, R. Paul Van Dam, Attorney General's Office, 236 
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, on the /XL 





Exhibit A Affidavit of Paul Buys, Recorder for City of 
Tremonton, and Professional Services Agreement 
Exhibit B Partial Transcript - Objection To Evidence Of Prior 
Bad Acts of Defendant 
EXHIBIT A 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL BOYS 
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER: 
ss 
STATE OF UTAH : 
I, Paul Buys, upon oath, state as follows: 
1. I am the City Recorder for the City of Tremonton, Utah. 
2. As such, I am familiar with and keep the records for the 
City of Tremonton. 
3. The City of Tremonton has contracted with Bruce Jorgensen 
and Thomas Willmore to provide legal services to the City of 
Tremonton and a copy of that contract is attached. 
4. Thomas Willmore has been handling the misdemeanor 
prosecutions for the City of Tremonton among other legal services 
pursuant to this contract from the date of the contract up until 
the present. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
Paul Buys 
Affiant 
Paul Buys, being first duly sworn does depose and say that he 
is the Affiant in the foregoing action, that he has read the 
foregoing document, and knows the contents thereof, and that the 
same is true of his own knowledge, except as to those matters 
therein stated on information and belief, and as to those matters, 
believes them to be true. 
Paul Buys 
Subscribed and sworn to before me t h i s /3 day of7 7yi j^rJk / 9? / , 
1991. 
. Notary r f i ^ ^ I V , lAluAturi^. 
Residing a t : £f <%y^ 6o 1 
Commission e x p i r e s : ^/>^/^/ 
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PROFESSIONAL SERVICES AGREEMENT 
2
^4 
THIS AGREEMENT made as of January 1, 1989, between 
Tremonton City, a Utah municipal corporation, 102 South 
Tremont Street, P.O. Box 98, Tremonton, Utah, 84337 (herein 
referred to as "City"), and OLSON & HOGGAN, Attorneys at Law, 
a Utah general partnership, 123 East Main, P.O. Box 115, 
Tremonton, Utah, 84337 (herein referred to as "Attorney"). 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, the City has previously employed Attorney as 
its general counsel on an interim basis beginning October 1, 
1988 and continuing through December 31, 1988; and 
WHEREAS, the employment relationship between the parties 
has worked to their mutual benefit and both parties desire to 
continue the same and to formalize their agreement in 
writing; 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants 
and agreements herein undertaken it is agreed between the 
parties as follows: 
1. The City employs Attorney as its City Attorney or 
General Counsel, said Attorney to represent the City in all 
matters requested of it by the City, and Attorney agrees that 
it shall do and perform any and all legal duties entrusted to 
it by the City, subject to any restrictions imposed by reason 
of conflicts-of-interest, provision of law or other similar 
source. 
2. The term of this Agreement shall commence on the 
date noted above and shall continue in effect until 
terminated by either party, which termination shall be 
effected by written notice from one party to the other at 
least thirty (30) days prior to the termination date stated 
therein. 
3. a. Attorney agrees and obligates itself to faith-
fully represent the interests of the City as its Attorney and 
the City agrees to and shall pay the Attorney for all 
services rendered hereunder at the hourly rate of $70.00 per 
hour, except for representation in connection with criminal 
matters, which shall be interpreted to involve representation 
of the City in prosecutions for the violation of City Traffic 
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and Criminal codes or ordinances and those actions directly 
related to such criminal matters. For representation in 
connection with criminal matters, the City agrees to pay 
Attorney a monthly retainer, payable at the first of each 
month, of $500,00. Attorney agrees to maintain daily records 
of the time committed to criminal matters and to reasonably 
advise the City's Manager and/or Police Chief if the time so 
committed for a particular month will exceed a total of ten 
(10) hours. The Attorney's fees for services on criminal 
matters in any month which are in excess of the ten (10) 
hours, shall be billed to and paid by the City on a monthly 
basis at the hourly rate noted above. Any costs advanced by 
Attorney for the City shall be billed on a monthly basis and 
paid by the client with each monthly remittance. 
b. The compensation agreement contained in this para-
graph shall remain in effect for services rendered through 
June 30, 1990, with any reconsideration or negotiation 
regarding the same to be considered and agreed to by the 
parties in March, 1990, and March of each year thereafter, in 
order that arrangements can be completed and the information 
available for the City to utilize as it prepares the budget 
for the next fiscal year commencing on July 1 of each year. 
4. Attorney shall not employ associate counsel, 
investigators or other professional assistance without the 
express, written consent of the City. In addition, the 
present staff assignments by Attorney of Bruce L. Jorgensen 
and Thomas L. Willraore, who work as the attorneys assigned to 
represent the City in civil and criminal matters respec-
tively, shall not be changed without prior approval by the 
City. 
5. Any notices required by the terms of this Agreement 
shall be in writing and shall be deemed to have been duly 
served if delivered in person to the party for whom it was 
intended, or if delivered at or sent by registered or certi-
fied mail to the business address for whom it is intended, 
said addresses as set forth above. The addresses of the 
parties may be changed by written notice to the other. 
6. This Agreement is for the personal services of 
Attorney and may not be assigned by either party. 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set their 




TREMONTON CITY, a Utah 
Municipal Corporation 
(CITY) 






IN RELATION TO WHETHER OR NOT YOU'D SEEN HIM BECOME 
BELLIGERENT. DO YOU RECALL TESTIFYING AT THE PRELIMINARY 
HEARING ABOUT — HAVE ''OU EVER SEEN AT ANY TIME OUT THERE WHEN 
YOU WERE WORKING WITH DON BFOWN THAT HE EVER BECAME 
BELLIGERENT OR HAD ANY PROBLEMS WITH ANYBODY? I'M TALKING 
ABOUT DON BROWN, I'M NOT TALKING ABOUT THEY OR THEM. DO YOU 
RECALL YOUR RESPONSE TO THAT? 
A NO, NOT RIGHT — NO. 
Q DO YOU RECALL THIS ANSWER, HE HAD A PROBLEM WITH ONE OF 
| THE WORKERS, YES. 
A YEAH, I CAN REMEMBER THAT MOW, YES. 
Q THEN THE QUESTION WAS, WHO. 
A YES. 
Q DO YOU RECALL YOUR RESPONSE? 
A YES. ED ROBINSO'vJ, OR ED — BLACK EDDIE. 
Q OKAY. A DIFFERENT EDDII THAN THE EDDIE APODACA? 
A YES, DIFFERENT EDDIE THAN — 
Q AND DO YOU RECALL WHAT BROWN TOLD YOU REGARDING THAT 
ALTERCATION? 
A YES, I — HE SAID 
MR. WILLMORE: YOUR HONOR, I'M GOING TO OBJECT THERE. 
IT'S BEYOND WHAT THE SCOPE OF CROSS WAS AND — 
MR. BUNDERSONi ABSOLUTELY IS NOT. 
THE COURT: I THINK THAT MR. BROWN ASKED THE QUESTION 
IF HE'D EVER BEEN BELLIGERENT BEFORE THAT TIME, AND SPENT A 
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QREfiT DIAL UF TIM! TQuKINS filOUT HIS ATTITUDE, 
MR. WILLMORE: I THINK IT WAS BELLIGERENT TO MR. 
ANDERSON. 
THE COURT: THAT WASN'T THE QUESTION. 
MR. BUNDERSON: HE WENT FURTHER THAN THAT, HE READ — 
THE COURT: THAT WASN'T THE QUESTION. I'LL ALLOW IT. 
MR. BUNDERSON: THANK YOU. 
Q GO AHEAD. 
A HE WAS — HIS — HIS STATEMENT WAS, I'D LIKE TO SEE MR. — 
OR ED TAKE A DIP IN THE LAKE AND NOT COME BACK UP. 
Q OKAY. AND DO YOU RECALL APPROXIMATELY WHEN THAT WAS? 
A NO. EARLIER IN THE WEE!*, OR SOMETHING. YOU KNOW, MONDAY 
OR TUESDAY OR SOMEWHERE AROUND THERE. 
Q OKAY. YOU WERE ASKED A SERIES OF QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR 
CONDITION WHEN — YOUR PHYSICAL CONDITION WHEN YOU HAD GIVEN 
THE TWO EARLIER STATEMENTS, THAT IS, YOUR WRITTEN STATEMENT 
AND YOUR VERBAL STATEMENT. 
A YES. 
Q OKAY. WHAT DAYS DID YOU GIVE THOSE STATEMENTS? 
A VERBAL — WRITTEN STATEMENT WAS ON THE DAY AFTER, AND THE 
VERBAL STATEMENT WAS THE SAME DAY. 
Q OKAY. SO WE'RE TALKING ABOUT THE £6TH, THE EVENT 
OCCURRED ON THE NIGHT OF THE £STH — 
A YEAH, IT WAS THE £STH. 
Q OKAY. AND YOUR EXPLANATION OF WHAT YOU MEANT BY COHERENT 
